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A B S T R A C T
Since the terrorist events of the 11th September 2001, the world as it was once known was changed forever. It
was these catastrophic terrorist actions over ﬁfteen years ago that saw the dawn of a new era with heightened
security across many everyday areas of society that had not previously witnessed such scrutiny or control.
Coupling this elevated risk of physical and technical aggression with the ever-increasing global per capita energy
demand – there has been witnessed a continually growing reliance on nuclear energy for baseline power gen-
eration, a form of electricity production that requires both the necessary international safeguards and controls
for its safe use. As more and more of the global energy budget is provided by low-carbon sources (over highly-
polluting fossil fuels), the volume of nuclear material in existence will grow substantially – requiring con-
siderable attention and policy to ensure its long-term safety and security.
This commentary describes the vast range of policy challenges faced by the nuclear industry resulting from
the rapid technological advancements being made across society, and how these directly (and indirectly) aﬀect
global nuclear security, as well as providing a thorough discussion on how best these challenges may be over-
come.
1. Introduction – A changing global energy budget
With 2011 marking the year in which the world population ﬁrst
exceeded 7 billion, current estimates place 2021 as the year when 8
billion people will inhabit our planet (The World Bank, 2017a; United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Aﬀairs - Population
Division, 2015). It may seem logical to conceive that the global energy
requirement is a direct consequence of the total global population –
with more people requiring access to electricity. Whilst the global po-
pulation explosion is in-part responsible for our total energy require-
ment, it is the total energy consumption per capita (Fig. 1(a)), that is
the ultimate driver behind our total power requirements globally.
Whereas at the beginning of the 1980's where the average person did
not own a computer, several televisions and games consoles or large air-
conditioning units, such items are now commonplace and have resulted
in a near two-fold increase in the amount of energy used per person
between 1980 and 2017 (Fig. 1(a)).
Resulting from the considerable environmental impacts brought
about by the burning of traditional fossil-fuels (coal, oil and natural
gas), combined with their ever-declining availability (physically, and
also through various geo-political circumstances) as well as consider-
able technological drivers, has led to a divestment in power produced
through these means, and what is viewed by many as a “renaissance” in
nuclear power (Grimes and Nuttall, 2010; Marcus and Levin, 2002;
Nuttall, 2005). Because of this increasing drive to liberate the vast
quantities of energy stored within the atom, after a brief recession from
2010, the per capita proportion of nuclear power contributing to the
global energy budget is increasing (Fig. 1(b)). This resurgence in nu-
clear energy (albeit later that many foresaw) is similarly paired with a
corresponding reduction in the proportion of fossil fuels consumed. As
shown graphically within Fig. 1(c), global fossil fuel consumption (per
capita) has begun to decline – with this reduction enhanced further if
China (the world's largest consumer of fossil fuels) is excluded
(Fig. 1(d)) (The Shift Project Data Portal, 2017a).
However, despite this observed growth within the sector, is it the
opinion of many that such a renaissance has not occurred and that any
upturn in nuclear growth is considerably smaller than was once en-
visaged (or widely-sold). This is often ascribed to the fact that the
building of new nuclear power plants is not economically viable via
private investment, given the vast initial facility construction costs and
the extended time for payback on such investment (Bradford, 2004;
Brown, 2008; van de Graaﬀ, 2016). Works including these also cite the
lack of large-scale facilities globally to deal with the wastes that are
produced by the nuclear fuel cycle, in spite of the technological
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progress and new facilities witnessed in northern Europe (Sweden and
Finland) (Darst and Dawson, 2010).
Such resurgence in nuclear is further demonstrated by not only the
total number of nuclear facilities operating globally, but also the total
number of plants undergoing construction as well as those at the
planning or initial design (proposal) stage, as shown graphically within
Fig. 2. Following the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
accident in Japan, several countries elected to halt their nuclear pro-
grams, including Japan and Germany. Whilst this represented a
signiﬁcant number of facilities to enter shutdown – as is shown in
Fig. 2, this was balanced by many reactors entering service in other
countries. It is estimated that by 2035, approximately 130 reactors will
enter retirement, however these will be replaced by nearly 300 new
units – many of which will provide a considerably larger power-gen-
erating capacity (IAEA, 2016; World Nuclear Association, 2017a).
2. More material, more risk?
Consequently, with more nuclear reactors located in ever more
countries, there exists (and will rise still further), a record amount of
nuclear material of varying types (e.g. enrichment, form and radio-
activity) distributed globally (World Nuclear Association, 2017a). This
presents considerable security, transport and health risks associated
with all stages of the materials lifecycle; from fuel precursors through to
spent fuel reprocessing, to wastes and ﬁnal disposal. A plot illustrating
the global uranium production directed into the fabrication of fresh
nuclear fuel for use in reactors is shown within Fig. 3. Despite annual
ﬂuctuations in the volume of material entering fabrication, there is still
evident a steady increase in material entering the nuclear fuel cycle.
Recent advancements in nuclear ﬁssion technology towards Small
Modular Reactor (SMR) systems, arising principally from their lower
projected construction costs and reduced proliferation risk makes them
(for the ﬁrst time) viable for private investment (World Nuclear
Association, 2017b). These perceived beneﬁts of SMR technology have
led many to speculate that the number of such units will increase ra-
pidly, to constitute a considerable component of many countries total
nuclear reactor inventory (Fig. 4).
Unlike “traditional” ﬁssion reactors which generate power in the
order of 1000 Mega Watt Electric (MWe), these oﬀ-site manufactured
reactors are designed to be brought on-site fully-constructed and pro-
duce an electrical output of less than 300 MWe during peak operation.
Whilst it may be the viewpoint of many that the wider distribution of
smaller volumes of radiological material represents an improvement for
safeguarding material from those wishing harm – with any potential
attack yielding access to only a comparatively small volume of nuclear
material, these reactors will still need to be kept highly-secure and
therefore require an eﬀective Nuclear Site Security Plan, following
INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 recommendations (IAEA, 2011), as for any other
nuclear installation.
Accentuated by this portended rapid and extensive growth in SMR's
around the world due in no small part to the diﬀering systems produced
by a large number of vendors detailed in a recent publication by the
National Nuclear Laboratory (2014a), several key challenges and
threats to current (as well as future) nuclear security are apparent. As
previously alluded to – the possibility of direct violent physical ter-
rorism on nuclear infrastructure is considered the most obvious risk,
Fig. 1. Per Capita: (a) Global Energy Consumption, (b) Global Nuclear Power Production,
(c) Global Fossil Fuel Production, and (d) Global Fossil Fuel Production – excluding China
(energy statistics and population) (The World Bank, 2017b; The Shift Project Data Portal,
2017b; IAEA, 2017).
Fig. 2. Breakdown of global reactor inventory over time, an increase across all categories
is observed. The following deﬁnitions are used in each case: “In Operation” - ﬁrst con-
nection to power distribution grid, “Under Construction” - ﬁrst concrete poured at site,
“Planned” - ﬁnal approvals and funding in place and likely operational within 8–10 years
and “Proposed” - Initial plans made public and site selected for suitability studies (IAEA,
2017; World Nuclear Association, 2017).
Fig. 3. Global uranium production (tonnes) directed to the production of new nuclear
fuel assembles (World Nuclear Association, 2017).
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and in the aftermath of recent global events, the threat of nuclear ter-
rorism is now viewed by many international organisations to be as great
as ever, as detailed in a number of summative works such as that of the
(Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 2016). This “nuclear terrorism” can
occur through actions such as direct physical attacks on nuclear power
facilities, its transport network or the sites in which material is stored,
potentially alongside co-ordinated cyber-attacks on the networks and
systems that are utilised in the sector. Despite intense screening, the
additional threat posed by insiders within these facilities cannot also be
excluded. With terrorism deﬁned not only as the use of violence, but
also the threat of its use, suitable fear and anxiety exists even without
any such acts ever occurring (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO), 2014).
3. Keeping stock is keeping safe
Due to greater volumes of radiological material disseminated
worldwide across the entire nuclear fuel cycle (from initial mining
through to ﬁnal waste reprocessing and storage), it becomes imperative
for countries as well as regulatory organisations (such as the IAEA and
Euratom) to accurately monitor radiological material, its location, form
and enrichment state. Two related, yet contrasting aspects arising from
this to impact future nuclear security are (i) smuggling: the act of
moving material for monetary gain to criminal gangs and terrorist
groups and (ii) proliferation: the spreading on nuclear material for
weapons (typically clandestine) programmes. The IAEA Incident and
Traﬃcking Database (ITDB) (IAEA, 2015) has reported a total of 2889
conﬁrmed unauthorised possession and criminal activity incidents be-
tween 1993 and 2015 where material had been moved without au-
thorisation and was intercepted by controlling authorities. Incidences
where material has successfully been traﬃcked are obviously un-
reported, but it is highly likely that international policing eﬀorts to
prevent or intercept illicit traﬃcking of nuclear materials are not al-
ways successful. Such is evidenced by the regional variation in reported
incidents made within the ITDB (IAEA, 2015). Whilst despite con-
taining less nuclear material as a region (IAEA, 2016), the total in-
cidents of theft and loss within Asia is one-ﬁftieth of that of the USA, a
disproportionality low amount.
With such growing risks associated with our future divestment in
fossil fuel power; a central aim for the future of global nuclear security
will be a strong commitment and requirement for (i) the physical and
technical protection of nuclear materials, (ii) the meticulous accounting
of nuclear materials, and (iii) the highly-accurate monitoring of nuclear
sites and borders – incorporating a strong focus on evolving
technologies, automation, robotics and the Internet of Things (IoT).
However, whilst representing a key opportunity for improved safe-
guarding and monitoring, there lies a range of potential threats from
each of these technologies (as is the case with any such system) if not
employed for the correct means by those wishing harm through co-
ordinated terrorist acts.
4. Threats and opportunities posed by new technologies
The rapid development of small but computationally powerful de-
vices for a variety of industrial, domestic and recreational uses provides
a rapidly evolving opportunity and threat register for nuclear facilities
worldwide. As such, the topic of nuclear security is rarely out of the
global media spotlight (BBC News, 2017).
One such opportunity, but also a potential threat in the future of
global nuclear security, is the rapidly evolving ﬁeld of drone or un-
manned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology. Accelerated markedly by the
events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan, light-
weight systems have been developed by a number of authors (Kurvinen
et al., 2005; Martin et al., 2015; Sanada et al., 2012), each capable of
achieving substantial ﬂight durations and distances (> 30 min and 10's
of km). When combined with the range of existing available detection
options, UAVs represent a means by which to gather large volumes of
valuable data over nuclear sites or in response to radiological incidents.
However, the availability of these systems to the public, coupled with
the ease at which they are operated (using a combination of conven-
tional hand-held remote controls and GPS waypoints) has already been
seen to impact upon operations surrounding airports – with numerous
reports of unidentiﬁed aircraft or airspace incursions around the world
(Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), 2016).
The potential use of these systems for physical attacks (not only on
nuclear institutions) has been viewed as signiﬁcant by a UK thinktank
(The Remote Control Project, 2016), with a number of media articles
also documenting recent global events (Nicas, 2015; Warrick, 2017).
Possible scenarios range from (i) utilising drones to carry explosive
materials into a nuclear site, potentially producing a criticality incident
with the accurate targeting of key on-site facilities, and (ii) following
the acquisition of radioactive material – using unmanned aerial systems
to disperse this contaminant material over a wide area, or population
centre.
Considerable recent advancements in artiﬁcial intelligence (AI)
technology could prove beneﬁcial for improving site monitoring using
these UAVs and without the need for operator input and guidance.
Conversely UAVs could also be employed in physical attacks (Clark,
2015). In these cases, the UAV operator need not be in direct commu-
nication with the system during the attack with the drone targeting pre-
deﬁned positions on the ground. Whilst a lone, well targeted UAV
system could cause moderate disruption and damage to a single item of
nuclear infrastructure, a coordinated ‘swarm’ could pose a much more
substantial threat. The term ‘swarm’ technology, was a concept in-
troduced by Beni and Wang (1993), whereby multiple robotic systems
can operate as a group independent of a human operator. UAV ‘swarms’
could facilitate simultaneous co-ordinated attacks of a site / sites, using
a signiﬁcant number of airborne systems inbound from diﬀerent
heights, directions and at diﬀerent speeds; in suﬃcient numbers such
that existing defences would be overwhelmed.
The last ten years has also seen the accelerated advancement of
battery technology with which to power these unmanned aerial plat-
forms. As a result of considerable research eﬀort from both industry and
academia, the amount of electrical charge that can be stored within the
same physical volume and weight has increased enormously (Scrosati
and Garche, 2010). Because of this, the typical survey duration possible
with a UAV has grown, and hence accordingly, the distance from which
attacks can take place has also increased.
Fig. 4. Anticipated SMR growth forming part of global nuclear portfolio. Despite the
apparent large uptake of small modular reactor technology to the year 2035, its share of
the global nuclear energy generation market is small (world nuclear production in 2014
= 2.417 × 106 GWe) (National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL), 2014b).
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4.1. Development of dynamic monitoring networks for nuclear monitoring
In addition to this remotely operated airborne technology, the use of
other robotic systems, within advanced monitoring capabilities, con-
tributes positively to the wider ﬁeld of dynamic radiation monitoring.
As a direct result of the extensive advancements that have occurred in
radiation detectors and their miniaturisation, a powerful suite of tech-
nology now exists to enhance the current strength of nuclear security.
This enhanced detection capability has enabled the production of
“dynamic sensor networks”, whereby a range of sensors can be de-
ployed using a range of mobile platforms, all feeding back autono-
mously in near real-time to produce an extensive data network of a site
or incident. The use of AI to process the numerous coincident data
streams, much like the human brain manages inputs from the body's
nervous system, means that temporal anomalies recorded by the sensors
in the network representing a divergence from a known and calibrated
baseline for the site can be rapidly veriﬁed and enacted upon.
As well as UAVs, mobile platforms able to carry these increasingly
more capable radiation detection devices include humans and cars,
however other (less mainstream) systems for dynamically monitoring
radiation include hovercraft (Jones et al., 1999) and pipe-crawlers
(Roman et al., 1993). Current work to advance the scope of dynamic
monitoring networks for nuclear security is investigating other re-
motely operated vehicles (ROVs) such as inﬂatable airships and min-
iaturised underwater submersibles.
Whereas dynamic sensor networks represent a means to actively
“search” for radiation anomalies, their inherent complexity, with the
required upkeep of the physical carrier platform, as well as the potential
challenges in referencing their position over the duration of their
survey means that static (ﬁxed position) systems will always exist as a
backbone within the future of nuclear site security onto which dynamic
ones are incorporated. Again, with the recent progression in detector
technology, numerous static systems that can be placed strategically
around nuclear sites or dispersed within a public setting, for continual
monitoring – typically based on gamma-ray detection (Lin et al., 2004;
Nabeshima et al., 1998). Typical examples of such systems include
“portals” (typically large archways) and “pads” (everyday objects such
as road cones, speed-humps and safety barriers) within both large ar-
rays of highly-sensitive gamma-ray detectors can be installed to
monitor for activity above normal background levels. Stemming from
work at CERN (Large Hadron Collider), the application of muon to-
mography and scattering (utilising naturally occurring sub-atomic
particles incident from space) for the detection as well as determination
of the type of any radioactive source material, is a further detection
method that now exists as part of the global nuclear security portfolio,
most commonly for the scanning of entire shipping containers or large
transport vehicles (Baesso et al., 2012; Borozdin et al., 2003; Thomay
et al., 2016).
All of the detectors employed as part of dynamic systems are hence
required to be both small and highly-portable, being widely dispersed
via the aforementioned range of potential carriers to provide a wide
spatial coverage. This distribution of hundreds, if not thousands (or
hypothetically tens of thousands), of various sensor types and their real-
time feedback to a single command point from where all of the in-
formation converges, is dependent on mass-network connectivity, the
ability to stream (securely) data wirelessly at a suﬃcient rate and
subsequently reprocess it eﬃciently (Hart and Martinez, 2006). Data
acquired from static sensors presents less of an issue with regards to
data transmission due to their ﬁxed position over time, and hence less
of a need for high-end data infrastructure and extensive coverage in the
case of continually moving, dynamic systems. Through deploying this
wide range of sensor options for monitoring, a ‘hub’ from which all the
platforms are capable from being dispersed and collating incoming data
steam is required. This hub would typically act as a ‘node’ via which
data acquired by the systems would be collated before transmission to a
central data facility. There is also the potential for this technology to be
used in a more covert method, to deliver a counter-proliferation cap-
ability, in identifying illicit nuclear weapons sites and materials.
4.2. Deployment of passive versus active sensors
Each of the detectors mentioned in the previous section may be
referred to as “passive”, whereby there is no external input of energy in
order to stimulate the detection of any potential radioactive material
(Knoll, 2010; Tsoulfanidis and Landsberger, 2015). The contrasting
type of system is what is termed “active”. Unlike the smaller, cheaper
and more readily transportable passive detectors, active type detectors
require the production of highly penetrating beams to determine the
internal structure of a large volume. Such systems include the use of
neutrons, electron / neutron-induced gamma-ﬂash or laser scanning to
examine the contents of objects such as barrels and large containers
(Estre et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2016).
Like any electronic device; to enable it to function even for short
periods it is required to receive power. For large, “active” devices this
demand is considerable – with vast quantities needed for their opera-
tion, supplied through dedicated power networks. On the other hand,
smaller “passive” devices which do not need to produce an activating
source to detect radioactive material, call for markedly less power. As a
result, potential exists for such low-power (static) devices (that remain
stationary indeﬁnitely) to beneﬁt from advancements in long-term
power supply for applications such as radiation store monitoring. Using
natural radioactive decay; such as that associated with 238Pu, 241Am or
more recently the β-decay of 14C, a small but suﬃcient current can be
produced to provide power to devices – acting as a “nuclear battery” to
trickle-charge systems (EPSRC, 2013) (Patent Applications 17074485.6
and 62/504,012). The system (Fig. 5), using a diamond tri-layer sur-
rounded by metallic contacts, has been invoked to be able to provide
thousands of hours of current from materials otherwise considered as
costly waste following power generation.
Current detector technology and the mechanisms by which to de-
ploy it for continued nuclear security into the future have witnessed
extensive progression over recent years, with great advancements in
detector crystal production, miniaturisation and spectral resolution
(Carchon et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2013). With the explosion in the
number of these detectors and limitless potential locations where they
could be installed, the future will likely not lie in the detection hard-
ware itself, but in their connectivity, automation, combined sensitivity
and ultimately how best to utilise the “big data” generated by such a
network of assorted sensor technology. Additional sensors can be in-
corporated alongside the radiation sensor in order to provide greater
situational awareness around any detection incident. This enables a
more detailed understand of what was in the area at the time of de-
tection to help focus appropriate responses.
Fig. 5. Schematic of the proposed diamond battery, consisting of the multi-layer setup
with diﬀering forms of diamond (radioactive and stable) encased within metallic contacts
(EPSRC, 2013).
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5. Data security and access
One of the fundamental questions to arise whenever nuclear site
data is accumulated is how securely it is held, and who maintains a
responsibility for its long-term security (stewardship). There are also
additional issues centred on the correct data access and its presentation;
making sure that those who require the data at varying levels are given
the best and most complete access to it.
To produce high spatial resolution radiation monitoring with the
greatest coverage achievable, data will be sourced from a range of not
only diﬀerent sensor types, but also diﬀerent organisations / bodies.
These organisations would typically include private companies such as
power plants, reprocessing facilities and the operators of large indoor/
outdoor event spaces in addition to public and law-enforcement groups.
Whilst the data derived from these sources would constitute part of a
combined data-map; certain data obtained from speciﬁc sites or found
to constitute “interesting” or “abnormal” results may not be fully dis-
closed, representing issues surrounding data ownership and how in-
formation pertinent to nuclear security should be shared. To provide
data into this combined system, complications arise surrounding its
transmission and processing. Whilst the Internet of Things (IoT) is be-
ginning to facilitate greater connectivity than ever before – re-
volutionising the data demand, questions need to be asked of how se-
curely the considerable quantity of data originating from the extensive
sensor network will be communicated back to locations where it is
collected and monitored. Recent high-proﬁle data hacks and system
inﬁltrations of large companies have highlighted the vulnerability of
many of what were assumed to be highly secure and well defended
systems – comprising high-end encryption and cutting-edge software
(BBC News, 2016). With the production of a shared repository into
which diﬀerent groups and organisations deposit their data as part of a
larger collective, issues regarding the responsibility to protect and
manage this data need be addressed. Through “Quantum Encryption”
over traditionally employed mathematical encryption forms, this future
form of data-handling will permit large data volumes to be transmitted
securely with clear knowledge of whether any data had been inter-
cepted on route (Boykin and Roychowdhury, 2000; Chen et al., 2008).
Attacks on computer networks as a result of the connected system are
only a small portion of the negatives, however, that result from the IoT
– with the 2015 Dell Annual Threat Report concluding that the number
of attacks on corporate and industrial networks has been increasing by
100% year-on-year from 2013 (Dell, 2015).
Due to the range of diﬀering sensors and carrier platforms that exist
in addition to its transfer via the IoT, the data that is produced will vary
considerably in its resolution and granularity. Relating back to the issue
of data access and roles in future safeguarding; whereas the data may be
collected at high resolution in many areas (and lower, more commonly
at others), there represents the need to control (and streamline) what
data is either seen by certain individuals and groups as well as the re-
solution at which they it. For example, those interested in the continual
routine monitoring of buildings and individual sites such as plant op-
erators will demand data at increased resolution than emergency re-
sponse groups such as the UK's Cabinet Oﬃce Brieﬁng Rooms (COBR) -
where a wider overview of the data is demanded.
Indeed, The Sendai Framework argues that to ‘understand disaster
risk’ it is necessary to ‘promote real time access to reliable data, make
use of spatial and local sensors, including geographic information sys-
tems (GIS), and use information and communications technology in-
novations to enhance measurement tools and the collection, analysis
and dissemination of data’. Risk mitigation must be built upon an em-
pirically grounded understanding of the nature of the hazards, re-
quiring an improvement of the integration of scientiﬁc knowledge into
government and community decision-making (United Nations Oﬃce for
Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015).
6. Conclusion
In conclusion, whilst future risks to national and international nu-
clear security will still be posed by groups or individuals wanting to
undertake direct physical violence or destruction, there will be a
growing threat posed directly or in conjunction with physical attacks by
more technologically-advanced methods. Whilst there still exists a
credible threat from physical attacks on nuclear infrastructure or from
groups dispersing acquired radioactive material within populated en-
vironments, the likelihood of an attack is considered to be low and the
threat level remains relatively constant. However, as a deterrent and a
representative illustration of capacity to prevent such attacks, a tradi-
tional armed and physical security presence will continue to be re-
quired on nuclear sites.
By contrast, the global evolution of smart technologies is unabated,
with the world having evolved unrecognisably over the past half a
century, mostly for good – with the invention and accessibility of the
internet recognised as pivotal in our history. Despite the immense
beneﬁts that these technologies have brought to society, including
quantiﬁable beneﬁts for the nuclear sector, the IoT and smart tech-
nologies more widely may also be viewed as one of the greatest po-
tential threats to global nuclear security over the foreseeable future. A
comprehensive and joined up physical and cyber security plan (both
covering the threat from an insider) is essential to counter the current
threats to the global nuclear sector. Some arising technologies will
present both a threat and an opportunity, e.g. the application of UAVs
in routine nuclear/security monitoring and emergency/security as-
sessment are of considerable promise, but at the same time present a
security threat, as many nuclear sites are not currently fully prepared
for the detection or prevention of co-ordinated incursions.
Ultimately, organisations responsible for nuclear safety and security
must be obliged to stay up to date with both emerging physical and
digital technologies that could enhance or pose a threat with respect to
nuclear monitoring, security and safeguards. The further development
of outcome based security regulation, placing the onus on the nuclear
site to demonstrate security/system eﬀectiveness, should encourage a
more innovative approach to tackling the threat. Instead of the histor-
ical prescriptive approach to security regulation, a change in this
methodology will encourage a stronger uptake of emerging beneﬁcial
technologies and stimulate the faster development of countermeasures
against those which pose a threat. This will likely necessitate close
liaison and resource sharing between defence and intelligence agencies,
delivering further tangential beneﬁts in other areas of national and
international security outside of nuclear.
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